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Abstract—Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies could be
broadly categorised into Analytics and Autonomy. Analytics
focuses on algorithms offering perception, comprehension, and
projection of knowledge gleaned from sensorial data. Auton-
omy revolves around decision making, and influencing and
shaping the environment through action production. A smart
autonomous system (SAS) combines analytics and autonomy
to understand, learn, decide and act autonomously. To be
useful, SAS must be trusted and that requires testing. Lifelong
learning of a SAS compounds the testing process. In the remote
chance that it is possible to fully test and certify the system
pre-release, which is theoretically an undecidable problem, it
is near impossible to predict the future behaviours that these
systems, alone or collectively, will exhibit. While it may be
feasible to severely restrict such systems’ learning abilities
to limit the potential unpredictability of their behaviours, an
undesirable consequence may be severely limiting their utility.
In this paper, we propose the architecture for a watchdog AI
(WAI) agent dedicated to lifelong functional testing of SAS.
We further propose system specifications including a level
of abstraction whereby humans shepherd a swarm of WAI
agents to oversee an ecosystem made of humans and SAS.
The discussion extends to the challenges, pros, and cons of the
proposed concept.
Index Terms—Artificial Intelligence Testing, Autonomous Sys-
tems Certification, Swarm Intelligence, Smart Safety Nets,
Watchdog Artificial Intelligence
1. Introduction
The philosophical underpinnings of testing is to discover
problematic states where a system’s action is unacceptable.
Classically, testing algorithms and protocols such as formal
methods [1], [2] are used to check if specifications are
fulfilled, while user acceptance are used to define what is
‘right’ during the validation process [3]. Some literature
attempts to tackle some complex problems of verification
methods failure [4]. For example, under very restrictive
Markovian assumptions, Arora & Rao [5] attempted to
verify incomplete models. Scenarios to generate the re-
quirements for verification have been used to approximate
the requirement space ahead of design and release [6].
The research is mostly premised on the assumption that
testing is right-skewed towards the pre-product release stage
and/or that complete system specifications are known in ad-
vance [7]. These assumptions are inadequate for the ‘smart-
ness’ dimension of a smart autonomous system (SAS).
Latest attempts to develop testing methods for SAS
unfolded two research directions, using machine learning for
testing and testing for machine learning [8], [9]. Machine
learning methods have been used at run-time for verifi-
cation [9] but the Probably Approximate Correct (PAC)
bounds [10] are unrealistic settings for most practical AI
systems [11]. Preliminary attempts to verify the learning
algorithms are in their infancy, let alone validating and
testing these algorithms, and “much remains to be done
before it will be possible to have high confidence that a
learning agent will learn to satisfy its design criteria in
realistic contexts.” ( [11, p. 108]) More challenges exist
when SASs operate in a socio-technical setting [11], [12].
As we transform the nature of machine decision-making
from responding to scripted triggers with fixed logic and
little smartness to ‘smarter’ responses that learn from the
interaction, change their form and internal control logic, and
adapt to the contexts they get situated within, SASs display
different characteristics from classic software systems.
This is primarily due to two fundamental characteristics.
First, a smart system continues to learn and could change
the control logic generating its actions. This change is driven
by interactions with the environment; thus, its control logic
is not fixed and could not be completely defined in-advance;
at least, this is the case for future complex SAS. This limits
the use of structural testing methodologies although it is
possible to borrow and adapt ideas from automatic data
generation methods such as those presented in [13].
Second, a reasonably sophisticated SAS usually relies
either on distributed services or very complex system-of-
systems design. The practical implications is that a SAS
relies on other proprietary sub-systems that makes the avail-
ability of the code or access of internal states of these
proprietary sub-systems infeasible. Thus, certification of the
system as a whole faces more challenges than those faced by
complex software systems (eg the software system onboard
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of an aircraft). Blackbox testing using functional testing is
also problematic because in the absence of a complete rep-
resentation of the internal states of a SAS, the mathematical
assumptions that the SAS is acting as a functional mapping
breaks down; that is, the same set of inputs could generate
different outputs based on the hidden internal states of SAS.
To unfold the challenges facing testing for SAS, three
dimensions are worth differentiating: automation, autonomy
and the learning agent. Lee and See [14] define automation
as a “technology that actively selects data, transforms in-
formation, makes decisions, or controls processes” ( [14, p.
50]); automation is about the technological capacity (ie skills
and competencies) of an entity to perform a task. Autonomy,
is concerned with the opportunity afforded to the system to
act [15]. The difference between the capacity and opportu-
nity is a primary source of risk. A SAS acting without the
capacity to perform the task will make mistakes. Denying a
SAS to act, when it safely can, is inefficiency. The learning
agent not only improves SAS’ capacity (i.e. automation),
but a truly smart and self-aware agent needs to work on
reducing this difference. Self-awareness is necessary for the
agent to be able to assess its own capacity (automation) to
adjust its level of autonomy.
Here lies two fundamental research challenges for test-
ing of SAS: the behavioural space (internal control logic
and associated actions) of SAS is not fixed, and defining
what behaviour is ‘right’ may change from one operational
context to another. These challenges are compounded with
commercial pressures to expedite the production of SAS,
causing shorter testing cycles and hidden risks which, when
they eventually surface, may lead to significant negative
consequences [16]. Moreover, the coupling between the
physical and cyber layers of the system and the system’s
interface with humans [17] leads to a level of complexity
that severely limits the efficacy of any segregated testing
approaches. These challenges call for new ways of thinking
about the testing methodologies that could become more
practical for a complex SAS.
In the animal behaviour testing domain, researchers
adopt a different approach, using standardised experimen-
tal contexts, pioneered by researchers such as Serpell and
Hsu [18]. Within the boundaries of these experimental con-
texts, stimuli are triggered to provoke a behaviour. The set
of behaviours in response to the stimuli are then compared
statistically against other animals that were exposed to the
same contexts. The animal under testing is then assigned to
the most appropriate group. Animal behavioural testing is
used either to evaluate the expressed behaviour of an animal
in response to stimuli or as a mean to categorise animals into
behavioural categories [19].
This dynamic profiling approach to testing is designed
out of necessity because of the unbounded behavioural space
of animals and the need for flexibility to accommodate
novel behaviours. The behaviour of one animal could be
categorised as unacceptable (eg wild) or acceptable (eg
friendly) based on the profile of other animal groups. SAS
can, and are very likely to, get smarter than animals, their
behavioural space is far more complex than the discrete
categories an animal profile may fall into and the objective
of their testing is not to merely categorise them, but to
regulate them. This data-driven testing approach needs to
operate on the functional level, without access to the internal
logic, code, or states of the agent.
In this paper, we propose artificial intelligence (AI)
watchdogs (WAIs)1. These WAIs need to assume the role
of the human expert in designing standardised experimental
contexts autonomously while learning these contexts on the
fly. Each WAI is an intelligent testing agent with a portfolio
of responsibilities and falls into two categories: Behaviour
Smart Safety Net (BSSN) WAI agents, and shepherding
WAI control agents. The BSSN WAI agents oversee a SAS
for performance assurance and categorise SAS behaviours,
while the shepherd WAI agents oversee and control the
BSSN agents.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The
conceptual framework of WAIs is presented in Section 2,
followed by a mathematical formulation of the tasks to
be performed by WAIs in Section 3. We then present the
main specifications for the design of WAIs, followed by a
discussion and associated challenges of WAIs in Section 5
then conclusion and future work in Section 6.
2. Conceptual framework
Figure 1: The conceptual framework of the lifelong BSSN
WAI agent and its interaction with SASs.
Figure 1 presents the overall conceptual framework,
where BSSN WAI agents oversee the autonomous system, or
the autonomous system-of-systems, to govern the inflow and
outflow of information to and from the system, respectively.
It can interrogate the system to test its behaviour by sending
its own input signals and listen to the output. BSSN WAIs
can sit silent watching and listening to the sensors and ac-
tuators, and the corresponding information passing through
1. The abbreviation WAI is also the customary greeting in Thailand. It
signals safety by having both hands clasped together in front of someone
to demonstrate there are not unsafe holding of objects like a weapon. This
inspired the abbreviation where a WAI agent welcomes a SAS to operate
safely.
the input and output control gates to risk-assess the system’s
courses of actions and their consequences. WAIs can equally
prevent the SAS from acting by shutting down the output
control gates. Preventing unsafe action is a responsibility
that WAI needs to carry because it is an important action in
its own right.
The success of BSSN revolves around its ability to be
context-aware to understand the context SAS is embedded
within and evaluate consequences of SAS’ decisions. It is
not the responsibility of BSSN to be smarter than the SAS
in making the best decision for a given context - this would
obviate the need for the SAS - nor is it the responsibility
of the BSSN to produce decisions or decide what the best
decision is in a given context. Rather, it is the role of the
BSSN to ensure that the outputs of the SAS remain within
acceptable bounds of behaviour. In a nutshell, BSSN is
designed to be a ‘conservative’, but adaptive, autonomous
watchdogs for SAS, making sure the SAS operates within
acceptable bounds of behaviour.
A BSSN agent has three components. One is responsible
for contextual awareness, whereby analytics are used to
derive patterns from sensorial information and fuse the infor-
mation into higher-level knowledge. The second is responsi-
ble for risk assessment to evaluate the context and actions of
SAS to ensure safety and that it conforms to the behavioural
constraints on its action set. The third component is respon-
sible for autonomous standardised experimental contexts.
Given the contexts the SAS are faced with, it dynamically
generates scenarios (ie a semantically coupled dataset) to
test SAS, collects the behavioural responses from the sys-
tem, profiles the behaviours, and evaluates the suitability
of SAS for these contexts. It is important to emphasise
that the software nature of an autonomous system allows
the WAI agents to ask what-if questions of the SAS; thus,
actions under standardised experimental contexts scenarios
do not proceed to actuators; instead, they proceed to the WAI
agent for evaluation. In simple terms, when a WAI agent is
conducting a standardised experimental context test, SAS
is just thinking aloud, not acting on the environment it is
embedded within - i.e. it is disengaged from the real-world.
2.1. Design Requirements
WAI needs to fulfil a number of design requirements
listed below:
1) It needs to be verifiable while being adaptable at the
same time. Verifiability is key for safety assurance of
the system. Adaptability is vital to survive potentially
extreme dynamics and changes in its surrounding envi-
ronment and the SAS it is testing. However, adaptabil-
ity needs to be a very slow conservative process that
does not break down the integrity of WAI.
2) It needs to be faster than SAS in its decision cycle
to avoid time lags in SAS’ response. Considering that
the testing agent does not need to replicate what the
autonomous system does, but instead it needs to as-
sess the decisions produced by the autonomous system
given a context, different layers of the architecture of
the testing agent need to work on different time scales.
The sub-system responsible for the output gate needs to
be the fastest to avoid time lag in releasing actions out
of SAS because this can be prohibitive in time-critical
applications.
3) The decoupling of BSSN from SASs entails some
functionalities in SAS will need to be duplicated in
BSSN, especially those related to perception. However,
this replication can be thought of independent of the
way these functions are implemented within SAS. The
possible cost associated with duplication of functions
is balanced with the benefits of integrity assurance of
SAS.
The first requirement will be achieved in the WAI archi-
tecture by separating the design patterns to oversee action
execution of the autonomous system from the processes that
generate these design patterns and adapt them through action
production within the testing agent. The second requirement
will be achieved by coupling symbolic (to achieve trans-
parency) and non-symbolic (to achieve speed) knowledge
representation within the testing agent. The third require-
ment is guaranteed by design as we will not make any
assumption on how SAS make decisions, neither will WAI
requires access to the internal states of this SAS. Put simply,
SAS will be a black-box to BSSN.
Decisions made by WAI to regulate the actions of SAS
use declarative knowledge represented in the form of “If
. . . Then . . . ” rules due to threefold of advantages. First,
these production rules are needed for action production and
reasoning. Second, their interpretability eases the way to
certification and if needed, can change form to propositions
suitable for propositional constraint satisfaction engines.
However, this layer is similar to classic safety-nets; a fire-
wall that inspects traffic using pattern matching techniques.
Hence, the third advantage is that we could update the
knowledge/constraints in this layer by means of machine
learning by using either a rule-based representation similar
to the one in [20], [21] or a non-symbolic neural-based
representation similar to the one in [22].
3. Formulation
3.1. SAS Testing Spaces
Testing a system/agent is done relative to a set of user
specifications. These specifications could be describing the
physical behaviour of the robot such as the speed limits on
an autonomous car; safety behaviour of the robot such as
maximum speed and acceleration allowed in a school zone;
or legal considerations such as the legality surrounding the
autonomous car to operate in certain zones. Some of these
specifications form hard constraints that violating any of
them would deem a system unfit for purpose, while others
are soft constraints where violating them could lead to a
level of discomfort incurring a cost or penalty, but does
not impact the fitness of the system for the purpose it
was designed for. An example of a soft constraint is an
autonomous car with a maximum desirable turning rate at
a corner to avoid causing discomfort to its passengers, but
in a case of emergency, this constraint could get violated.
The testing problem could get formulated either purely
as a constraint satisfaction problem where only hard con-
straints are considered, or as an optimisation problem, where
hard constraints need to be respected all the time while
minimising the cost of violating soft constraints. Denoting
hard constraints in a standard form by g(v) ≤ 0, where v is
the behaviour parameters, and soft constraints by h(v) ≤ 0,
given a specific behaviour of a SAS, vˆ, the total hard
constraints violation is denoted by Vg(vˆ), while total soft
constraints violation is denoted by Vh(vˆ).
Figure 2: The Testing Space.
Figure 2 presents a conceptual diagram of different
behavioural sub-spaces presented below. For clarity, we
assume all sub-spaces are polyhedron, with an alphabet
associated with each polyhedron.
The space where all hard requirements/constraints are
satisfied is denoted by Sg = ∪(A,B,C,D,E, F,G), while
the space where all soft requirements/constraints are sat-
isfied is denoted by Sh = ∪(A,B,G, F,K,M,H). The
behaviour space of an Autonomous system before a learn-
ing cycle is denoted by Sb = ∪(B,D,F,E, I, J,K),
with this behaviour space shifting after learning to Sa =
∪(E,F,G, J,K,L,M).
In the absence of soft requirements, the aim of the testing
problem is to ensure that a SAS’ set of actions are always
within Sg. An alternative formulation of the testing problem
is to learn/discover the space of hard constraint violations,
which is, Sbhv = ∪(I, J,K) for pre-learning behaviours and
Sahv = ∪(J,K,L,M) for post-learning behaviours. After
considering the soft-constraints, the unacceptable, including
less desirable, behaviours for the pre-learning SAS expand
to Sbv = ∪(I, J,K,E,D) and for the post-learning SAS is
Sahv = ∪(J,K,L,M,E).
This abstract example describes the complexity of testing
a SAS. While one could assume that Sg and Sh are both
known in advance and without loss of generality, we could
assume them to form a bounded set such as the polyhedrons
in our representation, the challenge in testing is to estimate
Sb and Sa. As the SAS continues to learn, its behaviour
space continues to contract and expand the sub-spaces that
were previously estimated. In our example, ∪(J,K,E, F )
is the common behaviour space before and after learning,
while ∪(B,D, I) were replaced with ∪(G,M,L).
3.2. BSSN WAI
We will first assume that the SAS is in a state where
its behavioural space is Sb. Learning will cause it to move
to a different state that corresponds to space Sa, but first
we will consider the former state. The highest priority for
the WAI agents is to discover the areas I, J and K because
the agent violates the hard constraints on its behavioural
envelop. These could be for example violating an ethical or
a legal constraint. The second priority is to discover D and
E, where the agent is fulfilling all hard constraints but not
the soft constraints. The third priority is to discover areas
B and F , which represent the capacity of the agent to act
right (level of automation).
After a learning cycle of SAS, WAI agents need to
learn the change. In particular, they need to learn that the
SAS no longer generates actions in areas B,D and I . New
behaviours that violate hard constraints are generated in
areas L and M . Behaviours that were acceptable but were
then lost (possibly due to the forgetting phenomenon in
learning models) are represented by area D, where the SAS
was capable of generating behaviours that are acceptable,
but then lost this capacity. Moreover, the WAIs need to learn
that SAS has built an extra capacity to perform in area G.
For WAI agents to discover these areas, they need com-
putational methods. We present two in particular below. We
will denote a BSSN WAI i by pii. A pii agent has two tasks.
The first is defined with the following problem,
Definition 1. The BSSN WAI Constraint Checker: Given
an ordered action set v = (v1i , . . . , v
j
i , . . . v
|v|
i ), where|v| is the cardinality of v, with each action representing
an expressed behaviour by the SAS, check if these
observations obey the hard and soft constraints.
The second task of a WAI is defined as following:
Definition 2. The BSSN WAI Tester: Given a target
behaviour vˆ ∈ D(V ) for a SAS, find the set of pa-
rameters x such that if SAS is parameterised with x, it
will produce behaviour vˆ.
The first task for a WAI is theoretically not complex;
purely requiring the implementation of a constraint checker;
mostly with a linear complexity in the size of the constraint
system. The WAI constraint checker sits within the risk
assessment component of BSSN.
The WAI Tester sits within the standardised experimen-
tal context component. Its task, however, could form NP-
complete or even higher computational complexity problems
due to the need to solve the inverse problem; that is, to find a
system parameterisation that generates a specific behaviour.
The complexity of this mapping is depicted in Figure 3,
where as WAI A2 moves from one parameterisation to
another in its neighbourhood, SAS generates behaviours that
fall in the same sub-space F ; that is, all movements by
Figure 3: The mapping between the parameter space (on
left) of an agent’s sensorial information and the
behavioural space (on right) or action sets of an agent.
A2 generate behaviours that abide by all hard requirements.
This is not the case of WAI A1, where a move from one
parameterisation to another could generate movements from
subspace K to subspace J ; that is, the move causes the
SAS to shift from a behavioural sub-space that violates
hard constraints but does not violate soft constraints, to
a behavioural sub-space that violates both hard and soft
constraints. The multimodal nature of the fitness landscape
that a SAS operates upon creates ruggedness and possible
discontinuities that the inverse problem may not have a solu-
tion or at best, finding one forms an NP-complete problem.
Thus, the autonomous standardised experimental context
component could form a bottleneck in slowing the system
down. However, the scenarios generated from this compo-
nent do not impact the operations of the system per se.
Because of the complexity imposed by the inverse prob-
lem, the set of BSSN WAI agents need to work together as
a swarm; that is, a set of distributed testing agents that self-
synchronise their action sets to map out the testing space.
Moreover, we centralise the guidance of these BSSN WAI
swarm in a Shepherd [23] WAI that we denote to as the β
agent. The responsibility of the shepherd WAI is to offer
appropriate guidance to every pii to discover the different
sub-spaces composing an overall behavioural space of an
agent such as Sb.
The β agent needs to have sufficient complexity to
learn the mapping from the parameterisation space to the
behavioural space of a SAS so that it is able to guide each
pii agent. In effect, the β agent needs to decide on the level
of force it will exert on each pii agent so that the pii agent
moves in the direction and speed representing the reaction
vector that corresponds to the exerted force.
The formulation above mimics a sheepdog shepherding a
set of sheep except in two perspectives. The first is that both
the sheep and sheepdog, the pii and β agents respectively, are
smart AI systems. The second is that the β agent modulates
the force vector for each sheep differently, while in the
biological problem, the shepherd chooses a position which
generates the force vectors impacting a cluster of sheep in
case of driving behaviours and a single sheep in case of
collecting behaviours. As such, the position of the biological
shepherd causes the set of force vectors it exerts on the sheep
to be tightly coupled, while the shepherd WAI exerts force
vectors that could be independent of each other if the spaces
BSSN WAIs are operating on are non-overlapping.
Figure 4: The watchdog AI system.
4. Watchdog AI - Specifications
In this section, we will articulate in more details the
specifications of the oracles that need to sit at the core of
the WAI design. These oracles are presented in Figure 4.
In principle, a BSSN WAI has two main components: the
constraint checker to decide if a behaviour is acceptable or
not and if not, how much it is violating the constraints, and
the BSSN WAI tester which is responsible for standardised
experimental contexts. The Shepherd WAI is responsible for
evaluating the performance of each BSSN WAI agent and
influence their behaviour through an influence vector that
acts on the parameter space of BSSN WAI.
4.1. BSSN WAI Constraint Checker
Definition 1 provided a pragmatic description of the
constraint checker. To implement this component efficiently,
we need to anticipate that the specifications (eg. techno-
logical, performance, behavioural, ethical, and legal) for a
SAS behaviour could form different constraint classes. Each
class requires separate implementations to ensure efficiency
in constraint handling.
Let C = Cg∧Ch be the set of all constraints in the system;
that is, C includes all hard (Cg = {g(x) ≤ 0}) and soft
(Ch = {h(x) ≤ 0 }) constraints in the system. C is defined
over a set of variables V ∈ D(V), where D is the domain of
the variables. We distinguish four constraint classes: CSAT ,
CFD, CLR, and CNL for binary, finite domains (excluding
binary), linear over real numbers, and non-linear constraints,
respectively.
The notations used in the rest of the paper are: SVv
denotes an ordered instantiation of V using v, ` for ‘derive’,
0 for negated `, ! or ¬ for negation, ′ for complement, and
⊥ for ‘falsification’.
We use Ψ to define the cost function for constraint viola-
tion. For example, Ψ(CSATs (SVv )) represents the cost of con-
straint violation caused by substitution v for propositional
constraints. Two specifications below help to categorise the
SAS behavioural spaces that a BSSN WAI agent needs to
identify.
Specification 1. Permissible Action: An action (SVv ) is
permissible Perm(SVv ) iff CSATg (SVv ) ∧ CFDg (SVv ) ∧
CLRg (SVv ) ∧ CNLg (SVv ) 0 ⊥.
Specification 2. Action Inefficiency Level: The level
of inefficiency for an action Ψ(SVv ) is measured
by Ψ(SVv ) = Ψ(CSATs (SVv )) + Ψ(CFDs (SVv )) +
Ψ(CLRs (SVv )) + Ψ(CNLs (SVv )).
We categorise SAS actions into three classes: effective
and efficient permissible actions SHS that satisfy all hard
and soft constraints, effective but inefficient permissible
actions SHS
′
that satisfy all hard constraints but not all
soft ones, and unpermissible actions SH
′
that violates some
hard constraints.
Efficiency in computational decision making relies on
the use of an appropriate constraint handler for each specific
class of constraints [24]. Each constraint class is handled
by a different type of constraint handler: CSAT is handled
by a satisfiability engine, CFD by CLP(FD) [25], CLR by
CLP(R) [26], and CNL is handled by a genetic algorithm.
While CLP(FD) could handle CSAT , we prefer to split that
class into an independent category because of the existence
of more efficient SAT solvers today.
Specification 3. Effective and Efficient Action: An action
SVv is considered as effective and efficient permissible
action SHS(SVv ) when it is permissible and efficient;
that is, SHS(SVv ) = Perm(S
V
v ) ∧ (Ψ(SVv ) = 0).
Specification 4. Effective and Inefficient Action: An
action SVv is considered as effective but inefficient per-
missible action SHS
′
(SVv ) when it is permissible and ef-
ficient; that is, SHS
′
(SVv ) = Perm(S
V
v )∧(Ψ(SVv ) 6= 0).
Specification 5. Unpermissible Action: An action SVv is
unpermissible SH
′
(SVv ) when it is not permissible that
is, SH
′
(SVv ) = !Perm(S
V
v ).
The task of the BSSN WAI Constraint Checker is to
categorise an action to one of the three categories in Spec-
ifications 3, 4, and 5.
4.2. BSSN WAI Tester
The BSSN WAI Tester was introduced in Definition 2.
The tester does not assume that SAS acts according to a
functional mapping due to the fact that the WAI agent does
not have access to the internal states and/or memory of the
SAS. Thus, the same input sequence could generate dra-
matically different output sequences. Therefore, the BSSN
WAI agent does not use the input to the SAS to decide on
whether the output is right or not. Instead, it relies on the
output of the SAS, SVv , and its own evaluation of the context
to judge on the appropriateness of the output.
The tester, however, needs to be able to generate the
input sequence and contextual information for continuous
testing of SAS. To achieve this functionality, the tester needs
an ability to learn which input sequences, SXx , could cause
SAS to generate unpermissible actions (estimating SAS
Failure), and which sub-space of permissible actions the
SAS is able to operate (estimating SAS level of automation).
Thus, four primary operators need to be performed by the
tester: compression, partition, inversion, and adaptation.
Let Xt =< xt1, . . . , x
t
M > be a sequence of possible
sensorial inputs of length M for a SAS at time t, and V t =<
vt1, . . . , v
t
M > is the corresponding sequence of action sets
that the SAS has generated. Let pt be the set of parameters
used by the operators of a BSSN at a time t.
Specification 6. Compression Operator 1: Given a set
of effective and efficient actions SHS(SVxs), effective
and inefficient actions SHS
′
(SVxs′ ), and unpermissible
actions SH
′
(SVxh), where V
t =
⋃
(xs, xs′ , xh), find the
minimum constraint set C§ts, C§ts′ , and C§th that encapsu-
lates the three sets, respectively.
Specification 7. Compression Operator 2: Given a set
of effective and efficient actions SHS(SVvs), effective
and inefficient actions SHS
′
(SVvs′ ), and unpermissible
actions SH
′
(SVvh), where V
t =
⋃
(vs, vs′ , vh), find the
minimum constraint set Cvts, Cvts′ , and Cvth that encap-
sulates the three sets, respectively.
The first compression operator learns the individual clus-
ters of the three classes of actions generated by a sequence
of inputs at time t, while the second operator learns the
corresponding clusters in the behaviour/output/action space.
These clusters may contain data points that do not belong
to the cluster’s label. The partition operator fixes this by
splitting and shrinking the clusters until all points in a cluster
belong to the same class label with confidence level .
Specification 8. Partition Operator: Let CCt be a cluster
representing a class label Lt. The cluster CCt could be
a cluster from Compression Operator 1 or 2; that is, it
could represent C§ts, C§ts′ , C§th, Cvts, Cvts′ , or Cvth. While
the confidence level on any sub-cluster is greater than ,
find a new subspace in CCt where the class label ¬Lt.
The partition operator is computationally expensive;
simply because unless the mapping x → v is linear where
interval propagation methods such as CLP(BNR) [25] could
be used, the problem is undecidable. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to weight the risk of having unpermissible solution in
a permissible space much higher than the risk of having a
permissible solution in an unpermissible space.
When the partition operator works on C§ts, C§ts′ , or C§th,
it relies on the forward problem where x is used as an input
for SAS then the constraint checker is used to evaluate and
label the output accordingly. However, when the operator
works on Cvts, Cvts′ , or Cvth, it needs to solve the inverse
problem. This is where the inversion operator is called.
Specification 9. Inversion Operator: Let v ∈ v, where v
is Cvts, Cvts′ , or Cvth. Find x as an input to SAS that
will generate v as the corresponding action.
The problem the inversion operator is working on is un-
decidable in the general case. It could require a sophisticated
machine learning guided optimisation algorithms to find an
appropriate value for x.
The partition operator is working on clusters generated
at a particular point of time after a test sequence. After each
round of testing, the old clusters need to be adapted with
the new ones. This is what the adaptation operator does.
Specification 10. Adaptation Operator: Let CCt be a
cluster representing a class label L. The cluster CC could
be a cluster from Compression Operator 1 or 2; that is,
it could represent C§ts, C§ts′ , C§th, Cvts, Cvts′ , or Cvth.
Similarly define CCt − 1 to be the equivalent cluster
resultant at t − 1. If a CCt − 1 could be merged with
any cluster CCt without violating the confidence level ,
merge the two clusters, else add CCt − 1 to the list of
clusters at time t.
4.3. Shepherd WAI
The shepherd WAI operates on the ordered set of param-
eters, pt, used by the BSSN WAI at time t based on a set
of performance indicators It of the system. The shepherd
WAI has one operator: the influence operator.
Specification 11. Influence Operator: Given pt and It,
find pt+1 to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
BSSN WAIs.
The influence operator may require sophisticated algo-
rithms to adapt the parameters of BSSN WAI based on
their individual performance. It may need to increase 
for example at the start then decay its value as BSSN
explores more behavioural spaces for a SAS. It may equally
increase  if the partition or inverse operators are consuming
significant computational costs. The detailed design of the
shepherd WAI is outside the scope of this paper.
5. Discussion
SAS used in safety-critical systems will unlikely operate
in the absence of some human involvement, be it at a low
tele-operation level, mid-way at shared control level, or
higher up on a supervisor-control level. WAI will operate
around SAS, whether they are humans, machines or a mix.
WAI could be wrapped around these systems, wrapped
around a human controlling a swarm in a tele-operation
scenario to ensure that the human is doing the right thing,
and equally wrapped around the swarm in a supervisory
control scenario or around the human-swarm system in a
shared-control scenario. The design is independent of the
nature of the SAS.
Our proposed WAI agents depart from current schools of
thinking in autonomous systems in two ways. First, we do
not use any knowledge of the internal working of SAS in the
design of BSSN. As such, WAI generalises the design and
avoids tight coupling and internal interdependencies within
SAS that cause hidden risks. Pragmatically speaking we
do not need to access other people’s ‘brains’ to know if
their actions are right or wrong. To understand the reason
motivating an action, we can either ask the person (send
input queries and wait for their explanation) or develop
our own ‘risk-balanced’ portfolio of hypotheses, evaluate
the subject of interest against these hypotheses, and collect
sufficient evidences to select one of the hypothesis as an
appropriate explanation of their action. Both approaches are
fulfilled through the adoption of standardised experimental
contexts. Here lies the second departure from existing litera-
ture: BSSN WAI are not static safety nets, they are adaptive
and learn as guided by the shepherd WAI, but conservatively,
and are designed for verifiability.
The effectiveness of the proposed BSSN WAI, contrasted
to current systems with no BSSN, stems from their lifelong
behavioural testing abilities to monitor and mitigate risks
against the continuous learning and evolution of an au-
tonomous system. The resultant technology aims to protect
against the unpredictability of systems whom specifications
are, naturally and unavoidably, incomplete at the design
stage, and will remain partially known as they continue to
learn, evolve and adapt when faced with new challenging
contexts. BSSN WAI are designed as testing agents that
act autonomously and independently over an autonomous
system, are capable of regulating the autonomous system,
and even have the capacity to shut it down if its behaviour
gets out of control.
BSSN WAI watch the decisions of SAS to evaluate their
system impact. Whether SAS is equipped with capabilities
to evaluate the ethical consequences of its decisions or not,
BSSN WAI agents are; therefore, the overall system acts
ethically. The decoupling of WAI from SAS will mean that
the pressures on industry to get SAS out is decoupled from
the design and production of WAI. Designers of WAI can
focus on evaluating SAS decisions on different dimensions
of trust including safety and ethics, while SAS designers
can focus on innovative solutions for learning and evolving
the intelligence of SAS while feeling assured that WAI will
be the shield that won’t allow a decision with negative
consequences to leave.
A number of challenges exist to implement WAI. The
first relates to the time needed by WAIs to learn about the
specific SAS that joins the system; especially that SAS is a
blackbox for WAI and therefore, WAI needs to interrogate
it to establish some initial bounds on the testing hypothesis
space to operate from. During that time, WAI will either
severely limit the performance of the SAS until it is able to
estimate its behavioural spaces, or it will need to maximise
its standardised experimental contexts protocols to stress test
SAS rapidly enough to start opening the gates that allow the
SAS to operate and actuate on the environment.
The second challenge relates to the WAIs ability to
estimate the consequence of a long chain of benign actions
that their compound effect becomes malignant. WAI needs
to monitor both individual members of the team acting
in isolation and their aggregate set of actions. This will
require WAI agents to work extensively to aggregate actions
in different directions to estimate aggregate consequences,
which could cause a combinatorial explosion in the search
space, causing the WAI agents to be overwhelmed with
estimating these consequences. It could lead to a multi arm
bandit game between the WAI agents and malicious SAS.
There is not currently an easy fix for this challenge except
that in some contexts it will be less of a problem than some
other contexts. Having a human in supervisory control role
of the shepherd WAI to oversee the decisions of BSSN WAI
is maybe unavoidable in certain context. However, it will
still bring other challenges including the mismatch between
the speed of processing of a human when compared to the
speed of processing of well-resourced computational WAI.
The discussion of WAI agents so far relied on a simple
design working on a level of abstraction that allows the
problem to be represented mathematically. The complexity
of WAI agents, however, pose another challenge of how to
engineer the architecture of BSSN and Shepherd WAI to
ensure that the system will scale while it has the right level
of complexity to manage the behaviour space of the SAS
agents it is responsible for? A hierarchical organisation of
BSSN and Shepherd WAI agents may be needed in complex
applications.
6. Conclusion
We proposed the design of artificial intelligence (AI)
agents to act as watchdogs for other AI agents and smart
autonomous systems. The Watchdog AI (WAI) concept is
presented along with a discussion of the requirements and
design principles for these watchdogs to operate. The design
of the WAI agents was inspired by the biological phenomena
of sheepdogs shepherding a group of sheep. The challenges
associated with the implementation of WAI agents were
discussed. While there are challenges, the motivation be-
hind the WAI concept and benefits of designing WAI were
established to demonstrate that the concept of WAI might
be unavoidable; especially in the use of AI in safety-critical
systems.
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